A Failure or "A Very Great Public Service"? Herbert Hoover, Iowa Banks, and the National Credit Corporation CALVIN W. COQUILLETTE IN THE FALL OF 1931, following banking crises in Germany in July and Great Britain in September, the Urüted States banking industry faced its own crisis of confidence. Perhaps the best indicator for measuring confidence, or the lack of it, was the number of bank failures. Bank failures nafionw^ide were accelerafing-dramafically. According to convenfional wisdom, banks failed primarily because they lacked liquidity. After all, German banks and Bdfish hanks-and their respecfive central bankshad not been able to maintain sufficient cash reserves to safisfy depositors; consequently, they were forced to declare moratoriums or renege on their commitment to pay in gold as the gold standard required. Believing that the problem of American banks could be reduced to a problem of liquidity. President Herbert Hoover proposed that the nafion's banks form their own nafionwide credit associafion to provide interbank liqviidity loans. In October 1931 this corporafion came to be known as the Nafional Credit Corporafion (NCC).
In mid-September, Hoover had good reason to believe that such an associafion of private-sector barücs could at least check if not reduce the bank failure rate. First, he believed that banks, spearheaded by the New York City banks, could effecfively spread liquidity throughout their industry. Second, he believed that a bank associafion could do so far more efficiently than a ticipating in a massive cooperative effort and by providing liquidity loans to troubled banks. True, the NCC did not create new money, finance new factories, stimulate additional credit, or firm up bond prices. But the NCC did prevent dozens of bank failures-that can be seen in Iowa alone-and it did inject some renewed confidence in banks at certain intervals. Perhaps its most useful service was establishment of an organizational floor for the launch of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in February 1932. The Iowa bank perspective from October through February provides a counter view to the historical assessment of "failure."
HOOVER first broached the idea of a "Nafional Credit Association" to the Federal Reserve Advisory Council on September 15, 1931.' Then, following England's abandonment of the gold standard on September 21, he met with George Harrison, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury, and his assistant, Ogden Mills; and Albert Wiggin, chairman of the Chase National Bank of New York. To stabilize the precarious banking situafion in the United States, Hoover called for a "unity of acfion in the face of unsettlement due to European economic events"; the underwriting of a $500 million bankers' associafion led by New York City banks "to support weak spots in banking"; bank associafion loan advances to receivers of closed banks (about 2,000 had failed since the stock market crash of October 1929) "so as to pay some dividend upon deposits"; extension of bank eligibility in the Federal Reserve System; recreafion of a War Finance Corporafion with $1.5 billion of resources; and a strengthening of the Federal Farm Loan agencies to reassure bondholders.3 . The notation in Hoover's handwriting appears on a Federal Reserve Advisory Board meeting agenda: "These men met with the President at the White House. Here the Près, first proposed the plan of the National Credit Association." Presidential Subject Files (hereafter PSF), Federal Reserve Board Correspondence 1931, box 159, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa (hereafter HHPL). 4. Again in Hoover's handwriting, "Programme proposed to Harrison, Mills, Mellon, and Wiggin Friday, September 25, 1931," PSF, Financial-Laval Visit Memoranda, box 1013, HHPL. Before proposing the NCC, Hoover had gathered crifical informafion from his advisers. At Hoover's request. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills provided an esfimate of total hoarded currency and a month-by-month breakdown of bank failures since January 1, 1930, with nafional banks shown separately from state-chartered banks. In addifion. Hoover asked Eugene Meyer, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, for a "solufion [to] the problem of frozen deposits in our closed barücs" (which totaled about $2 billion since the crash). In midSeptember 1931, the Federal Reserve staff had esfimated the amount of currency hoarded to be a "rock-bottom minimum" of $400 million-"and may be as much as $700 million." By the end of September 1931, Mills esfimated that the total had climbed to $800 million. If one adds frozen deposits in failed banks to the amount being hoarded by people who were afraid of banks, then about $3 billion, or roughly 7 percent of total bank deposits, was cut off from circulafion in the economy'
Hoover then called a meefing of 19 New York bankers, held clandesfinely at Treasury Secretary Mellon's Washington, D.C, apartment on Sunday, October 4. Attribufing the exisfing economic paralysis to the prolonged business depression, the succession of financial events abroad, the failures of banks in increasing numbers, and the destrucfion of confidence and rising fear around the country. Hoover called for "concerted acfion on the part of our leading bankers and strong banks to avert a possible threat to our enfire credit structure." He noted that 1,215 banks had failed and almost $1 billion in failed bank deposits had accumulated in the first nine months of 1931. More than half of the failures had occurred since June, freezing an esfimated $800 million in deposits. The combinafion of currency hoarding, bank failures, and failed bank liquidation all compounded geometrically. Bank failures inevitably triggered more hoarding and necessitated asset liquidafion to pay off depositors. Sound banks, fearing bank runs, sought to increase their 5. Hoover to Meyer, 8 September 1931 , PSF, Federal Reserve Correspondence 1931 Meyer to Hoover, 15 September 1931 , with attached memorandum from Goldenweiser to Meyer, 14 September 1931 Mills to Hoover, 1 October 1931, PSF, Financial Matters-Banking and Bankruptcy Correspondence, 1931, box 155, HHPL. liquidity by selling securifies. The stock, bond, and commodity markets, with more sellers than buyers, continued to decline. Hoover knew that "changing the eligibility provisions of the Federal Reserve Act"-whether to require banks engaged in interstate commerce to join the Federal Reserve, or to expand the list of assets eligible for rediscount at the Reserve Bankswould require fime, legislafion, and congressional hearings. And fime. Hoover believed, was running out. A better altemafive, he concluded, was to establish a nafional credit associafion of all banks, to provide rediscount facilifies on sound assets not then eligible at the Federal Reserve discount window. That, he hoped, would "restore confidence of bank depositors." He further suggested that a separate organizafion be set up to liquefy the deposits in failed banks. ' Hoover theorized that if bank failures could be checked, then hoarding would cease; if frozen bank deposits could be "thawed," then dollars would be put back to work in local communifies; if confidence could be restored among bank depositors, then perhaps bankers and investors would be more inclined to buy rather than sell. Clearly, the first order of business was to stabilize the deteriorafing economy. And far better. Hoover believed, if the stabilizafion effort could be effected in the private sector, without federal dollars and federal legislafion.
It is not clear whether all or only some of the New York bank execufives knew about Hoover's proposition in advance; whether all or some were so skepfical that it was doomed to failure from the begirming; or whether the bankers absolutely insisted on a War Finance Corporafion as a quid pro quo for setting up the Nafional Credit Associafion.' In any case. Hoover dictated a letter to George Harrison on October 5, while en route to Philadelphia to watch a World Series baseball game. Hoover confirmed that the New York bankers would "take the lead in immediate formafion of a nafional insfitufion with a capital of $500 million," which would rediscoimt bank assets 6. Copy of Prepared Statement Read to Nineteen New York Bankers Held at Secretary Mellon's Apartment, Sunday, October 4,1931, box 158, PSF, National Credit Corporation, Proposed Organization, HHPL. 7. Compare Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 24-25; and Parrish, Anxious Decades, 25-52,253. "not now eligible in the Federal Reserve System in order to assure the stability of banks throughout the country from attack by unreasoning depositors." The same enfity would loan against the assets of dosed banks "to enable them to pay some early dividend to depositors." In retum. Hoover agreed to seek legislafion to recreate the War Finance Corporafion "if necessity required. "°A lthough Congress was not in session. Hoover met with the leaders of both polifical parfies on October 6 and issued a press release to inform the nafion of the $500 million bankers' organizafion. He reported that $150 million, or 2 percent of the net fime and demand deposits of New York (Zity clearinghouse banks, had already been pledged. George Harrison and Ogden Mills, however, had convinced him that NCC loans on the assets of failed banks were unrealisfic. "The technical difficulfies of disposing of the assets of closed banks [through the NCC] as well as the amounts involved," Harrison argued, "make it seem impossible to tackle this part of the program."' The inability to free up failed barúc deposits left an enormous void in Hoover's attempt to revitalize confidence in banks. But given the momentum he had generated among bankers and legislators, and the immediate need to inspire confidence and mifigate fear, he opted to proceed. Hoover's announcement of the Nafional Credit Corporafion was carried with banner headlines in the nafion's newspapers the following morrüng, October 7.
FOLLOWING HOOVER'S ANNOUNCEMENT, bankers across the country mobilized franfically to meet Hoover's challenge. Hoover knew that 297 banks nafionwide had failed from August 28 through September 30. He probably did not know that 44 of the failures, or 15 percent of the total, were Iowa banks. Nor did he probably know that 25 more Iowa banks had failed by October 7, the day he announced the NCC. In about 5 weeks, more than 70 Iowa banks, including a few nafional banks, had closed. '" 8. Hoover to Harrison, 5 October 1931 , PSF, Federal Reserve, Correspondence, 1931 Reserve Bank of Chicago. The minutes noted that "the meefing would have been called several weeks before had there not been the well-founded apprehension that it would have attracted too much attention and only added, through any publicity that might have gotten out, to the general serious situation that was daily seemingly getfing worse." If bank failures were the primary indicator, Iowa's banks were probably more in need of help than those in any other state of the nation. Accordingly, the IBA wired Hoover on the afternoon of October 7 that "the officers and other members of this Associafion and your nafive state are delighted to say that your construcfive program has aroused profound interest. A committee has today been appointed with authority to do all within their power to work through the Federal Reserve System along the lines laid down in your statement."" The Iow^a bankers' reacfion to Hoover's announcement w^as mirrored in correspondence to the White House. Joseph Galcz of Chicago could hardly contain his praise when he noted that "the world series baseball game which you attended was filled with thrills and excitement and with brilliant plays, however, when you returned to Washington it is evident that you were filled with the spirit of wirming your game from the Club of depression; when you hit that half-billion dollar ball over the Association (Des Moines, 1932 ), 343 (hereafter IBA Proceedings, 1932 Proceedings, 1932,343-44. left field wall in the park of depression, you became the hero of the day."" If the reacfion of other bankers, legislators, and private cifizens was more restrained, it was sfiU mosfiy posifive. One excepfion was that of Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa, who commented that "the plan is utterly inadequate to meet the needs of the situafion and this is especially true of the farm loan situafion. The President should get rid of Mellon and Meyer and call Congress into extra session in order that a really adequate and comprehensive program can be worked out."" Brookhart's forecast of "utterly inadequate" was to prove true, of course, but that hardly dimmed the inifial enthusiasm. Because Iowa banking officials happened to be meeting on October 7, the state "was all ready to undertake the business of the NCC in Iowa before that Corporafion could develop itself sufficiently to indicate what was to be done.""
The organizers of the NCC-the New York banksprompfiy prepared a "Plan of Orgarüzafion and Operafion." Hoover and Mills received their copies on October 15. Mills responded that the NCC's $1 billion in gold notes "will be accepted as collateral for public deposits."' Within ten days of the October 7 announcement, the NCC had filed its articles of incorporafion, issued a Plan of Organizafion and Operafion, elected a board of 12 men, one from each of the Federal Reserve Districts, and held its first board meeting. By October 19 the board had appointed W. Harold Brenton, president of the Iowa-Des Moines Nafional Bank, as chairman of the Iowa Loan Committee. Brenton had his committee selected by October 24, and a week later "Nafional Credit Associafion No. 4 of the 7th Federal Reserve District," encompassing banks within the state of Iowa, had been formed as a subsidiary of the Nafional Credit Corporation in New York. On October 21-23 and again on October 26-28, the IBA and the Iowa Loan Committee held eleven separate group meefings throughout the state to explain the purpose and organization of the NCC. Almost 1,400 Iowa bank execufives attended one of the conferences. They were obviously relieved that frozen farm loans might yet be thawed with liquid funds. The meetings were followed by an Iowa Loan Committee mailing on November 7 that produced a posifive respor\se from over 80 percent of all Iowa banks. All committed to join the NCC and to subscribe 2 percent of their net fime and savings deposits. Frank Wamer, secretary of the Iowa Bankers Associafion, noted that "the plan is a novel one. There is no precedent to follow." Wamer, whose state led the nafion in bank failures and whose associafion's membership had declined by 20 percent since 1930, concluded that "there has been a 'right about face' in the public's attitude [toward banks] since the President's announcement." As in Iowa, the banking organizafions in New York and other states inifially embraced Hoover's concept with enthusiasm and commitment."
IOWA BANKERS-like farmers, businesspersons, and bankers everywhere-could not have known that, effecfive with Britain's departure from the gold standard in September 1931, the next three months would be among the worst in American economic history. When bank failures mulfiplied and were highlighted by the press, people looked to the federal government for a solufion. Hoover resisted any federal acfion unfil there was no other choice. Both Hoover and Iowa bankers preferred to await the inifial results of the NCC.
Frozen farm loans in Iowa and elsewhere were only one of the growing economic concerns in the United States in 1931. As revenues waned in the auto and railroad industries, U.S. Steel insfituted a 10 percent wage cut in September. As other large firms in other industries followed suit, an esfimated 1.7 million industrial workers were eventually affected."' Bond depreciafion was another serious concern. In the New York Federal Reserve District an esfimated 346 banks with deposits of $1.2 billion and capital of $205 n\illion (exclusive of New York City clearinghouse banks) had shown "probable bond shrirJcage" of $137 nüUion from the date of last examinafion. By December 1931 the shrinkage had nearly doubled to $238 million, more than $30 million in excess of total capital. A study noted that "if bariks continue to be closed by reason of bond depreciafion, the situafion must become steadily worse." Railroad bonds, which "have been regarded as one of the best and most conservafive investments," consfituted more than one-fifth of all bonds outstanding. Removing them firom the "legal list" would force addifional sales of bonds held by trust companies, insurance companies, and trustees. In the New York District alone, reporfing member banks had reduced their railroad bond holdings by $400 million. The report concluded, "Banks cannot be expected to buy railroad bonds while there is a threat of railroad insolvencies and the probability of continued decline in the prices of these bonds. They cannot be expected to employ their funds freely while there is overhanging ¿lem the prospect of many bank failures, which carry with them the threat of currency withdrawals and panic."'Û nlike the banks in the New York District, Iowa barücs were operating not just with the "prospect of many bank failures"; rather, Iowa banks were failing rapidly and successively during most of the last six months of Í931. W. G. Jackson, cashier of the Earlham Savings Bank in Earlham, Iowa, noted the crificism "heaped on the banks because they will not extend more credit to farmers." But he also noted that loans to farmers had caused the failure of most of the bartks in Iowa. Jackson also pointed out "the bank's duty to its depositors who have enough confidence in the bank to place their money there.""
In the absence of a federal guarantee on deposits, a loss of depositor confidence ulfimately doomed any bank to failure. Savings Bank, knew that only too well. "The country banker does not fear the bank examiner," he wrote, "but we do fear the atfitude of the depositor."^" Historians who claim that banks were unwilling-as disfinct from unable-to make loans fail to recognize that a bank's ability or willingness to loan was directly related to the stability of deposits. And deposit stability was directly related to depositor confidence.
The confidence of Iowa depositors in Iowa banks was reñected in the state's bank deposit totals, especially in comparison to banks nafionwide. Iowa bank deposits had been declining steadily since 1920. For the 12 months ending June 30,1931, the drop was about $53 million, or 12 percent. During the last six months of 1931, Iowa banks lost another $156 million, or 22 percent, compared to 11 percent for all of the nafion's banks. Loans in Iowa banks declined by one-third in the same period, compared to just over 10 percent for all banks. Loans by statechartered Iowa banks declined by 39 percent, deposits by 36 percent. Primarily because of declining farm prices, deposit and loan defiafion hit the predominantly rural state-chartered banks harder than it hit the city banks, where proporfionately more federally chartered nafional banks were located. During the 1920s and 1930s Iowa typically led the nafion in revenue from the sale of com and hogs, and com and hog prices declined faster than other farm prices in the last half of 1931. During that fime, the average price paid by packers was $4.05 per hundredweightless than half of the price paid in marketing year 1929-30. Com prices were even worse. The rafio of hog prices to com prices encouraged hog producfion. With hog prices at their lowest level in 35 years, Iowa's 10.5 million hogs (19 percent of the U.S. total) were a glut on the state's economy just like its failed banks.^'
If deposit stability and com and hog prices concerned Iowa bankers and farmers in the fall of 1931, so too did the problem of farm credit in general. According to Rex Yockey, Hanülton Depression, 1929 -1939 (Berkeley, CA, 1985 , 186; U. S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1932 (Washington, DC, 1933 County Farm Bureau agent in Webster City, the problems were fourfold. First, many Iowa communifies had "no credit facilifies or only parfial facilifies due to closed bartks." Second, the "hysterical condifion" or "lack of confidence" or "mental atfitude of depositors makes it necessary to the banker to carry large amounts of his deposits in liquid form to meet possible withdrawals." Third, there was a "peculiar aspect" of Iowa law that enfified the farm mortgagor (generally a life insurance company, not a bank) to both fitle to the land and to crops produced on or rent received from the land. As a result, mortgaged farmers could not borrow short-term using growing crops as collateral. Finally, there was the position that mortgage-free fanners found themselves in if they wished to borrow for whatever reason. Such a loan was only eligible for rediscount with the Federal Reserve if it was secured by "grain in the bin." As Yockey put it, "If this man did not happen to have grain for security which would make it [the loan] liquid, he nüght be derüed the loan."" By fall 1931, the farm mortgage crunch was apparent in Iowa and surrounding farm states. The average per acre value of Iowa farmland had declined fi:om $210 in 1920 to $128 in 1929 and to $109 in 1931. In 1929 the prevailing amount that could have been mortgaged on Iowa farmland was $81.63 per acre, or about 64 percent of the value; by late 1931, the average mortgage amount had declined by about one-third to $55.33 per acre, or about 50 percent of the value. Moreover, the number of farm mortgage concerns "acfively lending" had dropped by over 70 percent. During the 1920s, many farm mortgage lenders, including banks, had permitted their farm borrowers to pay interest only. By 1931, however, over 90 percent of all farm mortgage lenders required borrowers to regularly reduce loan principals. The crunch was especially pronounced in Iowa. Of an esfimated nafionwide total of $9.2 billion in farm mortgage debt, which required $568 million in annual interest, Iowa farms accounted for $1.1 billion, with interest of almost $70 million. Almost one-quarter of Iowa's gross farn\ income went to service farm mortgage debt, compared to 10 percent for the nafion as a whole. The total dollar an\ount of mortgaged farmland in Iowa was about double that of 22. Rex Yockey to R. K. Bliss, 10 October 1931 , PSF, Farm Matters, 1931 California and Texas, the next two highest states, with combined arable crop acreage about five fimes Üiat of Iowa."
In short, deposit declines and marginal farm mortgage and operafing loans had forced many Iowa hemks to close in the decade preceding 1931. The state had lost more than 900 of its barücs since 1921; 208 failures, 12 percent of the U.S. total, occurred in 1931 alone. In the past decade, American bank failures had buried a total of $4.9 billion in deposits, with almost $380 million, or 8 percent, emanafing from Iowa banks. Orüy Pennsylvarüa, with failed hemk deposits of $424 million, and Illinois, with $419 million, exceeded Iowa's total." And there, the failures of large banks in Philadelphia and Chicago, which occvirred mostly in 1931, inflated their state deposit totals. With a state populafion that was only one-third that of Philadelphia or Chicago, Iowa's bank failures had occurred sooner and were far more numerous and frequent. The combinafion of higher per capita deposits in failed Iowa banks and higher per capita farm mortgage and related loans outstanding-coupled with the com/hog glut and further declines in grain and pork pricesmeant that cash and asset values were probably declining faster in Iowa than in any other state.
President Hoover was certainly aware of the publicity given to barJc failures and of weaknesses in the U.S. banking system. But in the fall of 1931 the most important need was to inject some confidence into the economy and provide the banks with breathing room. Iowa bankers were frustrated by the coverage that newspapers gave to bank closings, and Hoover's announcement of the NCC was probably designed to neutralize to some extent the public's reacfion to those reports. James Traer, vice-president of the Farmers Nafional Barüc in Vinton, noted in September that "the Des Moines Register is rather making a feature of bank closings, publishing the day's closings in a column (Washington, DC, 1933), 207, 212. next to the obituaries." He wondered if these items might at least be scattered throughout the paper. J. P. Hess of the Carroll County State Bank believed that "such news spreads rapidly from mouth to mouth and increases the unrest." H. M. Wilson, cashier of the State Barik of Lacona, told Frank Wamer that he had "been checking up quite carefully among customers and they all say pracfically the one thing, 'we read the list of bartks closed everyday and you can't blame us for taking our money outofthebanks.'"'' Harry AUfree of Cedar Rapids offered Hoover a pracfical, if polifically impossible, suggesfion. Realizing that "when a depositor wants his money, he wants cash, not conversafion, nor farmers' notes, nor any kind of security," AUfree suggested that "the average person has lost confidence in everything except his Goverrunent." He suggested that Hoover have Congress "pass a Resolufion guaranteeing the deposits of Nafional Banks." He pointed out that "you have charge of them now through your Comptroller of the Currency" (the regulator of nafional barücs, distinct from state bank regiilators), and that other banks should not be precluded from joining the nafional bar\k system.^* AUfree essenfially proposed that nafional bank deposits be federally guaranteed and that state banks, if they could not meet mirümum federal requirements, be eliminated from the system. Had Hoover been able to bypass or convince 48 state barJ< superintendents and 48 state banking boards, not to menfion the 15,000-plus state-chartered banks, that the power of bank regulafion and supervision should pass from state to federal hands, the later collapse of the industry might have been avoided. Once again, fime and confidence were Hoover's biggest considerafions, and during the month of October 1931, he did not believe that federal intervenfion was required; nor did he doubt that the NCC was capable of solving the bank liquidity crisis. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE on October 30, Hoover announced that a "very great change" had become evident in the financial situafion of tihe country. Currency hoarding had been checked, gold shipments abroad had slowed, bank failures had dropped from an average of 25 a day to seven in the past week, and the price of wheat had advanced 10 cents a bushel. The New York Times opined that Hoover had advanced the NCC "as the main shaft of the machinery by which he hoped to pump life again into the business structures of the country, and it was obvious from his demeanor yesterday that he is finding much safisfacfion in its operafions up to this fime." The daily trade journal, the American Banker, had announced, "Nafional Credit Corporafion Now Ready to Funcfion," with the sub-headline "No Loans Made Yet; Perfecfion of Subsidiary State Associafions Awaited."
The fact that no loans had been made yet concerned Walter Stew^art, a former New^ York investment banker now serving as an administrafion adviser on banking. He suggested that there might be little substance to future NCC loan operafions and was convinced that "in the existing mood of the [New York City] bankers, they cannot be depended upon, if left to themselves, to put the Credit Corporafion into full and prompt operafion." He urged George Harrison and Ogden Mills to "take vigorous acfion aimed at changing the state of mind of leading barikers in New York." He also advised that someone from the Treasury and Federal Reserve should oversee the "actual progress" of the NCC's operafion.^' Stewart was especially concerned, perhaps at Hoover's behest, with the dilemma of closed banks and how to free up deposits in failed banks. There was no easy way to aggregate the total amount of assets and liabilifies of all closed nafional banks to produce a "combined detailed balance sheet." Every closed nafional bank had its own bankruptcy receiver, usually a polifical appointee w^ho proceeded at his own pace with few federal guidelines. Stewart discovered that the U.S. or eventual reopening of closed nafional banks. He recommended that the Treasury proceed "through the Federal Reserve BarJcs" to either the NCC or the larger New York City banks "with a view to obtaining credit upon selected assets of closed banks and making cash distribufions to depositors."N othing came of Stewart's proposals. The "polifics" of barü<: regulafion-^which agency had what role in the case of failed banks, the gathering of aggregate data, the appointment of receivers, and the ulfimate disposifion of each failed bank-was left unresolved.
Iowa bankers, while no doubt concemed about failed bartks and their depositors, were probably more concemed about salvaging the state's remairüng banks. Bank survival depended on having sufficient liquid funds on hand. Because bankers desired to build liquidity, the NCC Iowa Associafion envisioned that the dollar amount of loans requested might exceed the amount of "subscripfion funds" required that were payable to New York headquarters and based on 2 percent of net deposits. Accordingly, the Iowa Loan Committee sent two of its members to New York to secure "concrete assurance that funds would be available." By early November, the Loan Committee had sent out several hundred letters to prospecfive borrowing banks urging that they "prepare their collateral and applicafions in complete form" to submit to the committee. Frarü< Wamer reminded bankers that the NCC "is a giganfic undertaking, an enterprise that is to operate in 48 states and the District of Columbia and with approximately 22,000 American barücs." Being first in line and best organized might streamline loans to Iowa banks in need."
Delays were inevitable. Whether they were attributable to the New York bankers ignoring the exhortafions of Hoover and Mills to "get moving," as one historian claims, or whether the delays occurred at the local level, it seems that the local associa- (2) determining whether or not the prospecfive borrower was in basically sound condifion; (3) determining whether the bank was operafing for the commuruty at large or for "a few wealthy individuals for their own convenience"; and (4) determirung whether there was "an economic necessity for the bank in its parficular locality" In addifion, collateral had to be evaluated. "We are preparing to receive city and farm mortgages, collateral real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages, stocks, bonds, secured and unsecured notes of individuals, firms, or corporafions substanfiated by a first-class financial statement."'' In contrast, the Iowa Loan Committee, because of anficipated requests from farm banks, would have been more concerned with bank loan policies pertaining to grain and livestock. Were farm borrowers required to administer serums to prevent hog cholera? Were crop producfion expenses in line with yields per acre? Could other sources of farm revenue, such as eggs and cream, be used to service operafing loans?
Dozens of local NCC Associafion Loan Committees around the covmtry (New York state alone had eight) had to feel their way along, relying on the tools and legal forms that bankers knew best, and somefimes traveling hundreds of miles to a central meeting point. Contrary to some historical interpretafions, the bottleneck on booking NCC loans was more at the local associafion level rather than in New York, at least through December.'3 By the first week of December, bankers arovind the country, Iowa bankers included, had begun to lose their enthusiasm for the NCC. Hoover later noted that "by the end of November 1931, our small burst of recuperafion had petered out, and all the ground we had gained-and more-^was quickly lost."" Here was the low point of the NCC, leading to Hoover's decision to ask Congress to revive the War Finance Corporafion. Louis Kurtz, chairman of Iowa's largest bank, the Iowa-Des Moines Nafional, wrote to Hoover to urge that the War Finance Corporafion take the place of the Nafional Credit Corporafion. While he thought that the NCC "is doing a fine piece of work, they cannot do so sufficient to properly care for the situation exisfing in the agricultural districts of the middlewest."''' Kurtz's nephew, W. Harold Brenton, was both president of the Iowa-Des Moines Nafional Bank and chairman of the NCC Iowa Associafion's Loan Committee. Both men were aware that the Iowa Loan Committee could not prudently accept Iowa farm and chattel mortgages as collateral for NCC borrowings with so much farmland in bankruptcy, so many banks in liquidafion, and com and hog prices sfill declining. Credit had all but shut down in the state, whether from banks, building and loan associafions, insurance companies. Federal Land Banks, or farm implement dealers. As Iowa Governor Dan Turner noted in a telegram to Hoover on December 7, We would respectfully call your attention to the very serious situation in Iowa and adjoining states. For the first time in a generation, it seems to be impossible for our fanners to obtain even the most conservative loan on their land. This is adding a heavy burden to an already serious situation. Something should be done as soon as possible to ease the farm loan market not only to aid the fanner but also the smaller banks in agricultural communities. It is now apparent that the War Finance Corporation should be reinstated at once or similar method provided to meet the emergency.' ON DECEMBER 7,1931, President Hoover proposed to Congress that the War Finance Corporafion be reconsfituted and renamed the "Reconstrucfion Finance Corporafion." The corporafion was intended to replace or supplement what the Nafional Credit Corporafion had failed to do, or could not do, or had not done, depending on one's interpretafion. Hoover proposed that Eugene Meyer chair the RFC as he had done for the WFC, and that the RFC legislafion be passed as soon as possible.
The House and Senate Banking Committees held hearings before Christmas and chaUenged the results of the NCC to date. Senator Bulkley of Ohio told Meyer that the NCC was not even making loans. Meyer repUed that loans were being made, but he did not know how many or the amount. Bulkley believed that the NCC had failed. He had been told that "fiie bar\k pool found the situafion such that loans could not be made with safety and that the banks wanted [the RFC] to take over loans which they considered doubtful risks." Iowa Senator Smith Brookhart, never one to hold back if there was a chance to attack "Wall Street," reviewed the history of the WFC and asked Meyer, "Isn't the present situafion brought about by the big financial crowd making fooUsh loans after the war? You keep saying that the proposed bill will help the small banks; what about the big New York banks?" Meyer responded blandly, "It wiU help all the banks and the country generally." That hardly safisfied Senator Bulkley. He thought that the NCC "ought to funcfion before we put this new corporafion [the RFC] into effect." Moreover, he feared that frozen banks assets were going to be unloaded onto \he RFC.
But that was precisely the point, responded Melvin Traylor, president of Chicago's First Nafional Bank, in his tesfimony. Traylor was a Democrat and a member of the Federal Reserve Advisory Council to whom Hoover had first proposed the concept of a "Nafional Credit Associafion" the previous September. Traylor, like Hoover irüfially, saw the NCC as a temporary, voluntary, and emergency enfity orüy. "To pursue this policy to the end," he argued, "would mean tying up $500 million in slow assets," which would aggravate tihe problem of the banks and be of no aid to the economy. The problem of financing marginal assets that ranged from deteriorating railroad bonds to delin-quent farm mortgages, he confinued, should be the funcfion of a government orgarüzafion, not the banking industry. While Eugene Meyer thought the biggest problem was that "strong banks are afraid of the weak ones," Melvin Traylor believed that it was "a lack of public confidence in today's banking system."'' Both were right.
THE NCC finally made its first loar\s just after Hoover's call in December for legislafion to erect the RFC. It made more loans through February 1932, when Congress decisively approved the RFC. Barxkers and NCC officials realized that the RFC legislafion would easily pass despite some scattered opposifion and that NCC advances made on marginal hank assets could probably be "taken out" or replaced by RFC funds. Senator Carter Glass, ranking minority member of the Senate Banking Committee, acknowledged that some NCC assets would have to be made eligible for rediscount by the Federal Reserve Banks. The result was that the NCC served as a bridge for banks tottering between failure and dire need of liquidity assistance.^' Although most state associafions or loan committees were inifially too poorly organized to process loans effecfively, the Iowa Loan Committee, which was organized earlier and more efficiently than most of the others, proved its worth. By yearend 1931, a total of orüy about $10 million had been loaned nafionwide. One-third of that total went to three Iowa barücs. Three million dollars had been advanced to the closed American Savings Bank in Davenport, soon to be reopened as the newly capitalized Davenport Baiü< and Trust Co., and another $650,000 had been advanced to two banks in Des Moines. In addifion, NCC loans in late December to bariks in North Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana helped to stem a regional crisis in the South.'' After struggling to get organized during its first three months of operafion, the NCC finally got rolling in the next three weeks. 36. New York Times, 19 and 22 December 1931; U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings on S. 1: Creation of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 71a. Cong., 1st sess., 176,263. 37. Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 29-30; Proceedings, 1932 , 353. 38. Time, 28 December 1931 see also Olson, Hoover and the RFC, 30. By January 22,1932, the day Hoover signed the RFC legislafion, the NCC, through its local associafions, had made total loans of $145 million to 644 banks in 10 of the 12 Federal Reserve districts. Some $449 million in debentures had been subscribed and $429 million in gold notes were reported signed. In the Richmond and Atlanta districts, more than $30 million had been loaned, excluding almost $17 million in commitments to be drawn on in the next two weeks. In the Boston district, $14.8 million had been advanced. An addifional $10 million had been committed to banks in the state of Maine alone. New York district banks had borrowed only $8.3 million, but $15.3 million was committed to northern New Jersey banks. And although the St. Louis district had borrowed only $6.7 million, commitments pending totaled $11.5 million, $5 million to troubled Arkansas banks alone. In all, 3,940 banks, or almost one in every five banks in the United States, joined the Nafional Credit Corporafion within 14 weeks of Hoover's first public announcement."
In the Chicago Federal Reserve district, which included Iowa, 141 banks borrowed a total of $12.2 million by January 22, not including $6.2 milHon in commitments.'^ In the Iowa Associafion, a total of 220 Iowa banks "manifested some direct or indirect interest" in joining the NCC. Gross subscripfions actually received totaled $1.1 million from 51 Iowa banks, while another $1.2 million from 97 other banks were "in process of being gotten in proper form" by the fime the RFC came into existence. In addifion, 40 Iowa barüks borrowed a total of $2 million from the NCC, exclusive of loans made earlier to the Davenport and Des Moines banks."' The NCC also loaned $4.7 million nafionwide to 28 banks that were subsequently closed by January 22. The only failed-bank loan in Iowa was for $160,000 to the Farmers Loan and Trust Co. of Iowa City Its failure in 1932 left the city with the distincfion of being the largest in Iowa without a bar\k unfil the newly chartered Iowa State Bank and Trust Co. was 39. "National Credit Corporation-^Subscriptions to Gold Notes, Loans Made, Etc., as of January 22, 1932 ," PSF, Financial Matters, NCC Board of Directors, box 158, HHPL. 40. Ibid. 41. Report of the Special Committee, part 3, "National Credit Corporation," in Proceedings, 1932 formed later that year." SfiU, 770 other banks around the country had failed since the corporafion was organized. Undoubtedly, the Iowa and nafionwide total would have been even higher without the NCC.
Certainly the relafively successful NCC experience in Iowa was tainted with frustrafion. Harold Brenton summarized it best when he praised Frank Warner, the IBA's indefafigable secretary, who also served as secretary/treasurer of the Iowa Loan Committee. The work of the NCC, Brenton wrote, "was certainly a tedious, firesome, aggravafing job. You knew that it would not succeed thoroughly but you sfiU went ahead and did the best you could with the restricfions placed upon you." Warner had sent out 33 buUefins to IBA members and to the loan committee since early October, the latest concerned with, among other bureaucrafic details, authority to change "Arficles of Agreement" of banks having subscribed and in the process of subscribing; obtaining "Cerfificate of Elecfion of Officers" and specimen signatures; and obtairüng "Cerfified Copy of Bank Charter." The paperwork was overwhelming. Before considering a loan, the NCC Chicago office required three executed copies of a loan applicafion; three copies of "Opinion of Counsel"; three copies of "Resolufion of Board"; two copies of "Note for Borrowing Bank"; three copies of "Security Offered by Bank"; two copies of cerfified financial statements; two cerfified copies of the bank charter; and two cerfified copies of board resolufions or bylaws relafing to loans to the bank. With each amendment or change in form, Warner's office had to stop and correct all the copies of the different forms for each bank, which "runs into correcfing thousands of these forms at a fime." During the fall and winter of 1931-32, Warner had two teams of six secretaries each, one team working from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the other from 5:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. every day except Sunday.'*' Wamer was no doubt discouraged by the NCC's efforts and results, but the NCC did help to salvage a few IBA member banks. While $145 million in total NCC loans to banks hardly represented an overwhelming success, the distribufion of loans to marginal barücs in troubled economic spots was crucial to relieving liquidity pressures. Confinued deflafion, loan liquidafion, and deposit outflows resulted in contracted bank balance sheets. The results in Iowa indicated that barJdng and agricultural credit would require unprecedented federal intervenfion if either or both were to be salvaged. THE REVIVAL of the War Finance Corporafion (later renamed the Reconstrucfion Finance Corporafion) was both the federal government's strategic attempt to deal with an economy that had been in almost confinual decline since mid-year 1929, and Herbert Hoover's tacfical response to the "failure" of the Nafional Credit Corporafion. Hoover and subsequent historians have generally ignored three crucial intervals between October 7, 1931, when the NCC was first announced, and February 17, 1932, when the RFC began making its first loans. The first period was October 7-30, when rampant hsnk failures were halted, the financial markets revived somewhat, and business regained some lost confidence. The second period was the last half of December, when crifical NCC loans stabilized some key banks in Iowa and throughout the South. The third period was January and early February 1932, by which fime the local loan committees had streamlined their procedures and NCC loans were flowing freely. The same loan committees and streamlined procedures remained intact for the RFC to ufilize, enabling it to loan approximately $22 million to 325 Iowa bar\ks by Jime 1. Without the NCC's committees and procedures, the RFC could not possibly have analyzed, processed, and booked that many loans that quickly."" No. 4 of the Seventh Federal Reserve District (the Iowa Association), ibid.; Report of the Secretary, 1931 -1932 ," in Proceedings, 1932 . Of the approximately $22 million in RFC loans to Iowa banks through May 1932, $14.3 million was approved by the Iowa Loan Conrunittee, $4 million was approved in Chicago, and only $3.3 million was sent directly to Washington and approved. Although loan funds were ultimately advanced by the RFC's The quesfion remains whether Hoover saw the NCC as a temporary, stopgap measure-the RFC being its inevitable sequel because ihe NCC had "failed"-or whether he saw the NCC in 1931 as \he catalyst to "win the war" against the Great Depression. It seems that Hoover, at least inifially, saw salvafion to the bank liquidity crisis in the NCC. By November, though, with mounting railroad problems, a declining bond market, and volafile price swings on commodity markets, it would have been vinrealisfic to believe that a few hundred million dollars in interbarik liquidity loans could have salvaged the deteriorafing economy. Both Hoover and the bankers were frustrated at fimes by the NCC and disappointed in the results, at least through mid-December. Yet the contemporary evidence confirms that Hoover-contrary to the lamentafions recorded in his memoirs twenty years later-thought the NCC served a useful purpose. In a letter to Morfimer Buckner, president of the NCC and chairman of the New York Trust Co., on December 14, 1932, about a year after he called for RFC legislafion before a joint session of Congress, Hoover requested "data" on the NCC "as would form the basis of a future historical account of what was really a very great public service."*^ With the complefion of the NCC's work. Hoover expressed his grafitude for a job well done.
While frozen deposits in failed banks during December 1931 and January 1932 alone totaled over $400 million, fiie NCC booked loans to almost 650 bariks amounfing to $145 million. Moreover, the corporafion actually raised $449 million in pledged subscripfions through three "installment draws" during January 1932. Finally, the local NCC Loan Associafion committees provided the infrastructure for the RFC and were of inesfimable aid in launching the new program.
Washington headquarters, most of the applications and processing, especially from smaller banks, was handled at the local level or at one of the 33 regional offices. At its peak the RFC processed hundreds of loans each week, but only a relative handful found their way to the RFC board of directors in Washington for actual deliberation. See "Loans to June 1, 1932 of Reconstruction Finance Corporation," in Proceediitgs, 1932 ,354. 45. Hoover to Buckner, 14 December 1932 , PSF, Financial Matters-NCC Correspondence, 1932 , box 158, HHPL (emphasis added).
In 1952 Hoover wrote an obituary for the NCC-"ultraconservafive, then fearful, then finally died"-and lamented the delay by Congress in passing his RFC legislafion. Like the historians who have followed in his wake, he ignored the fact that some banks and bankers were doing some crifical liquidity financing through the NCC during this difficult period. It is true that the amounts were small and the results were mostly ineffectual, especially in view of the collapse of the banking system a year later. The NCC was the coUecfivist effort of an industry that, with Hoover's prodding, attempted to deal with its own hemorrhaging and salvage its failing brethren.
Historian William Leuchtenburg, wrifing in 1966, noted that "by the autumn of 1931, bankers had carried out the policy of deflafion so relentlessly that they were caught in their own web. Once deflafion threatened the financial structure, bankers were curiously unwilling to experience the spiritual benefits of chastening." Leuchtenburg blamed the banks for causing deflafion, forgetfing that plenty of "chastening" had already affected the numbers of farm community banks and dollars of frozen deposits in the previous decade. He concluded that "the barJ<ers demanded government protecfion from the consequences of deflafion to themselves."'" Instead, the NCC was a vintage Hoover strategem that produced some qualified success in an economy going from bad to worse. It demonstrated that banks and the banking system could be saved: state-chartered banks and state bankers associafions were the keys to the NCC organizafion and operafion, probably more sd in Iowa than in any other state. If the perspecfive from Iowa is any indicafion, then the Nafional Credit Corporafion was not simply a product of a demand from bankers for government protecfion. If it was not an unqualified success, neither was it a total "failure."
46. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, 257.
